What Must Cause Injury in Products Liability? by Gershonowitz, Aaron
Indiana Law Journal
Volume 62 | Issue 3 Article 7
Summer 1987
What Must Cause Injury in Products Liability?
Aaron Gershonowitz
Western New England College of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj
Part of the Litigation Commons, and the Torts Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School
Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Indiana Law Journal by an authorized editor of Digital
Repository @ Maurer Law. For more information, please contact
wattn@indiana.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gershonowitz, Aaron (1987) "What Must Cause Injury in Products Liability?," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 62 : Iss. 3 , Article 7.
Available at: http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol62/iss3/7
ARTICLE
What Must Cause Injury
in Products Liability?
AARON GERSHONOWITZ*
INTRODUCTION
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne
who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous ...
is subject to [strict] liability for physical harm thereby caused .... "I What
does the word "thereby" refer to? Is it the product, the sale of the product,
the defective condition of the product or the unreasonable danger? Comment
c to section 402A suggests that the product must cause the injury.2 Most
courts, however, seem to have assumed that the defective condition of the
product must cause the injury.3 This Article will examine the methods by
which courts have attempted to answer the question of what must cause
injury4 and will suggest that they must broaden the scope of their inquiry.
Objects are generally static. They usually need the active participation of a
person to cause injury. In most products liability cases, there are two active
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, Western New England College School of Law. Associ-
ate, Riukin, Radler, Dunne, Bayh, Uniondale, N.Y. The author gratefully acknowledges the
research assistance of Mr. Tim Mezarra, Western New England College School of Law, Class
of 1986.
1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment c (1965). The comment discusses
"the justification for the strict liability" and refers to "injuries caused by products," indicating
that the "thereby" in the text of 402A may refer to the product.
3. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 461, 150 P.2d 436, 440
(1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) ("[I]t should now be recognized that a manufacturer incurs
an absolute liability when an article that he has placed on the market ... proves to have a
defect that causes injury to human beings.") (emphasis added); Greiner v. Volkswagonwerk
Aktiengesellschaft, 429 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Pa. 1977) (plaintiff proved that the product was
defective, but judgment for plaintiff was vacated because plaintiff failed to show that the defect
caused the injury); Nelson v. Brunswick Corp., 503 F.2d 376 (9th Cir. 1974) (judgment for
defendant because, although the product was defective, the defect did not cause the injury).
4. The vast literature on causation in tort law has caused one commentator to suggest
that new works on the subject may be superfluous. Calabresi, Concerning Causes and the Law
of Torts, 43 U. Cm. L. REv. 69 (1975). Almost all of this vast literature has treated causation
in strict liability as though it was identical to causation in negligence. See, e.g., A. BECHT &
F. MILLER, THE TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION IN NEGLIGENCE AND STRICT LlAaILIY CASES
(1961); H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (1959); Epstein, A Theory of
Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1967); Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV.
1737 (1985).
This Article will suggest a number of ways that causation in strict products liability differs
from causation in negligence.
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parties-one who made or sold the product and one who bought or used
it. Because product related injuries usually result from the interaction of
these two parties, it is impossible to determine the cause of an injury without
examining the risks created by both the seller and the user of the product.
In recent years, a number of courts have moved away from the position
that the defective condition must be the cause of the injury. Some courts
have made causation a part of the definition of defect, holding that a product
is defective if it causes injury.' Some courts have attempted to merge caus-
ation with established defenses by suggesting that damages should be ap-
portioned by comparative causation instead of using the defenses of
comparative or contributory negligence. 6 Other courts have used a pre-
sumption of causation in "failure to warn" cases because it is often difficult
for the plaintiff to prove that the "failure to warn" caused the injury. 7 This
Article will examine each of these attempts to grapple with the issue of what
must cause injury and will argue that the best rule is one that apportions
damages by comparative causation and uses injuries caused by the product
to determine the defendant's share.
The ambiguity concerning what must cause injury probably results from
strict products liability's roots in the law of negligence. Prior to the adoption
of section 402A, persons suing in tort for product-related injuries usually
had to prove that the manufacturer or seller was negligent.8 One of the
primary reasons for the adoption of section 402A was the perceived need
to relieve plaintiffs of some of the burdens of proving negligence.9 The
problem of "what must cause injury" does not arise in negligence cases. Thus,
5. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978) (holding that a product is defective "if the plaintiff proves that the product's design
proximately caused his injury and the defendant fails to prove.., that on balance the benefits
of the challenged design outweigh the risk inherent in such design"); Caterpillar Tractor Co.
v. Beck., 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska 1979) (adopting the Barker v. Lull rule); and Azarello v. Black
Brothers, Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) (manufacturer is guarantor of product safety;
thus if any aspect of the product causes injury, the product is defective).
6. See, e.g., Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149, 159 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying Virgin
Islands law); Sun Valley Airlines, Inc. v. Avco-Lycoming Corp., 411 F. Supp. 598, 603 (D.
Idaho 1976); Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co. 665 S.W.2d 414, 424 (Tex. 1984); Thibault v.
Sears, Roebuck and Co. 118 N.H. 802, 810, 395 A.2d 843, 850 (1978); Butaud v. Suburban
Marine & Sporting Goods, Inc., 555 P.2d 42, 47 (Alaska 1976) (Rabinowitz, J., concurring).
7. See, e.g., Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1096 (1974) (basing the presumption on comment j to RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF
ToRTs § 402A (1965), which states "where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume
that it will be read and heeded"); Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, Inc., 399 F.2d 121 (9th Cir.
1968); Nissen Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820 (1975), rev'd
on other grounds, 265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976).
8. See generally Prosser, The Assault Upon The Citadel, 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Prosser,
The Fall of The Citadel, 50 MINN. L. Rav. 791 (1966); Traynor, The Ways and Means of
Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. Rav. 363 (1965); and Wade, Strict Tort
Liability of Manufacturers, 19 Sw. L.J. 5 (1965).
9. See, e.g., Escola, 24 Cal. 2d at 463, 150 P.2d at 441 (Traynor, J., concurring) ("An injured
person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evidence [of proper care] or iden-
tify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the manufacturing process .... );
Phipps v. General Motors Corp., 363 A.2d 955, 963 (Md. App. 1976) (reasoning that strict liability
is needed to relieve plaintiffs of "the proof requirements of negligence actions.").
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if section 402A is viewed as an attempt to deal with some problems
plaintiffs were having with proving negligence, it is easy to see why the
drafters of the Restatement did not directly address the issue of what must
cause injury.
The problem of "what must cause injury" does not arise in negligence
because the negligent act cannot be separated from the risk created by the
act. An act is negligent only if it creates an unreasonable risk of harm that
causes harm to one who is part of a group to whom harm was reasonably
foreseeable.' 0 Since a finding of negligence requires each of these factors,
one cannot separate them and say, for example, that the negligent act caused
the injury, but the risk of harm created by the negligent act did not. If the
risk of harm created by the act did not cause injury, the negligent act could
not have, because the act is negligent only if it creates an unreasonable risk
of harm that causes injury. In strict products liability, however, the factors
are separable. Cases exist in which the sale of a defective product creates a
risk of harm that causes injury, but the seller is not liable because the defect
did not cause the injury.
Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co.," may be such a case. In Cun-
ningham, the plaintiff alleged that he contracted polio as a result of ingesting
oral polio vaccine manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff further
alleged that the vaccine was defective because the defendant failed to ade-
quately warn of the danger.' 2 A jury verdict for the plaintiff was reversed
because the plaintiff had failed to provide evidence that the failure to warn
(the defect) caused the injury.'3 The court reasoned that in order to prove
that the failure to warn caused the injury, the plaintiff must prove that if
an adequate warning was given, the plaintiff would not have used the
product. Thus, the product was found to be defective and the injury
resulted from the risk of harm created by the product, but the defect did
not cause the injury.' 4
Similar results may be reached in negligent "failure to warn" cases, but
most often on the grounds that the risk was not reasonably foreseeable. In
McLaughlin v. Mine Safety Appliance Co., Is for example, the court used
that reasoning to reach a result similar to Cunningham. The plaintiff, a six-
year-old girl, nearly drowned and was assisted by a nurse and a fire de-
partment rescue crew. A fireman gave the nurse some "MSA Redi-Heat
10. See PRossER & KEEToN §§ 30-31 (W. Keeton 5th ed. 1984).
11. 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975).
12. Id. at 1379. The local health department sponsored a mass polio immunization clinic
using Sabin oral polio vaccine manufactured by defendant. The sponsors of the clinic were
aware of the risks but defendant made no effort to warn the participants in the immunization
program. Id.
13. rd. at 1382. Plaintiff did not offer any evidence concerning what he would have done
if adequate warning had been given. Moreover, the court noted that there was evidence that
plaintiff would have used the product even if warned. Id.
14. Id.
15. 11 N.Y.2d 62, 181 N.E.2d 430, 226 N.Y.S.2d 407 (1962).
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Blocks" to help keep the child warm. The nurse applied the heat blocks
directly to the child's body and the heat blocks caused severe burns. The
fireman had been warned not to use the heat blocks without additional
insulation, but he failed to pass the warning on to the nurse.' 6 The court
of appeals, in reversing a jury verdict for the plaintiff, recognized that the
jury could have found that the warning to the fireman was inadequate, that
the sale of the product with an inadequate warning created an unreasonable
risk that users would be injured and that the injury resulted from that
unreasonable risk. The court concluded, however, that the risk of harm to
the plaintiff was not reasonably foreseeable.'7 The negligence was conse-
quently not the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury.'
The difference between what must cause injury in negligence and what
must cause injury in strict products liability led the Cunningham and
McLaughlin courts to reach different conclusions on cause-in-fact. The Cun-
ningham court found that the failure to warn (the defect) was not a cause-
in-fact of the injury because the plaintiff could not show that an adequate
warning would have prevented the injury. The McLaughlin court did not
question cause-in-fact because the defendant's sale of the product without
an adequate warning created an unreasonable risk that users would suffer
burn injuries, and burn injuries resulted. In negligence, the negligent act
cannot be separated from the risk created by the act in order to determine
which one caused the injury. In strict products liability, however, the de-
fective product, the defect and the risk created are separable. A difficult
cause-in-fact question therefore remains: what must cause injury in strict
products liability?
I. SALE OF THE PRODUCT AS CAUSE
One might read section 402A as providing for strict products liability
whenever the sale of a defective product causes injury.' 9 Common usage of
the word "cause" makes it difficult to visualize how anything but an action
can be a cause.20 Objects are generally static and need someone or something
. 16. Id. at 65-67, 181 N.E.2d at 431-32, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 408-10. The fireman was instructed
about the need for added insulation. The containers in which the blocks were packed also
instructed users to insulate the blocks. The fireman removed the blocks from the containers
and handed them to the nurse, thus depriving her of the opportunity to read the instructions.
Id. at 70, 181 N.E.2d at 434, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 413.
17. Id. at 72, 181 N.E.2d at 435, 226 N.Y.S.2d at 414. The court concluded that the jury
could have found that defendant should have made the warnings available-to the nurse, but
the defendant's action was unforeseeable. Id.
18. Id.
19. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 402A (1965), "One who sells ... is subject to
liability .... .
20. Webster's New College Dictionary defines causation as "the act or agency by which an
affect is produced." WEaSTER's NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 177 (1976). Black's Law Dictonary
provides basically the same definition. BLACK's LAW DICTiONARY 200 (5th ed. 1979).
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to act on them to cause injury. Because the only action section 402A requires
of the defendant is the sale of a product, section 402A could mean that the
sale of the product must cause injury.
Requiring the causal link between the sale and the injury would avoid the
cause-in-fact problem presented in Cunningham.2' In Cunningham, the sale
of a defective product created a foreseeable risk of harm and the court
found that although the harm resulted from the risk created by the sale,
the plaintiff had failed to prove that the "failure to warn" (the defect)
caused the injury.22 A change from "defect must cause injury" to "sale
must cause injury" should lead to a different result because "but for" the
sale, the plaintiff would not have been injured. A rule that requires the sale
to cause the injury would thus help the plaintiff avoid the cause-in-fact
problem he faced in Cunningham.
A rule that requires the sale of the product to cause injury is likely to be
overbroad. The rule will result in liability in many cases in which the
defendant is obviously not responsible for the injury. The facts of Price v.
Ashby's, Inc.,23 illustrate this overbreadth.
In Price, the plaintiff purchased a car from the defendant. The car had
a defect that caused one side of the car to dip. The plaintiff was injured
when he drove off the road while trying to make a turn at fifty to sixty
miles per hour. The court upheld a directed verdict for the defendant because
the plaintiff was unable to show any connection between the defect and the
failure to negotiate the turn. 24 The plaintiff could not, the court concluded,
show that the defect caused the injury. Indeed, the court indicated that
inattentive driving may have caused the injury.25 If one applies a "sale must
cause injury" rule, the plaintiff may beat the directed verdict because "but
for" the sale of the car, this injury may not have occurred. Yet it is quite
unfair to make a seller pay for injuries that resulted from inattentive driving.
Several commentators suggest that in strict products liability, it is the sale
of the product that must cause injury.26 They avoid the overbreadth problem
21. Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975). If not for the sale
of the product, the injury would not have occurred.
22. Id. As the court explained, to prove that "failure to warn" was a cause of injury, a
plaintiff must establish that if adequately warned, plaintiff would not have used the product.
Id. at 1382.
23. 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d 1064 (1960).
24. Id. at 57, 354 P.2d at 1066. The defect consisted of a hole in the line between the tank
and the airlift mechanism that led to the right front wheel. The escape of air apparently caused
the settling of the car when the car was not running. When the motor was started, the front
portion would regain its prior level. Thus, the court held that the defect was not a possible
cause of the accident. Id. at 55, 354 P.2d at 1064.
25. Id. at 56, 354 P.2d at 1065. Plaintiff's own testimony indicated that he was inattentive
at the time of the accident. Id.
26. See, e.g., Green, Strict Liability Under Sections 402A and 402B: A Decade of Litigation,
54 TEx. L. Rv. 1185 (1976); Owen, The Highly Blameworthy Manufacturer: Implications on
the Rules of Liability and Defense in Products Liability Actions, 10 IND. L. REv. 769, 783-84
(1977); Phillips, Product Misrepresentation and the Doctrine of Causation, 2 HoFsTmA L. REv.
561 (1974).
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by examining the plaintiff's use of the product as part of the causation issue.
Their argument is that sellers, through the marketing process, lead consumers
to behave in certain ways. If consumers are injured as a result of using the
product in a manner that the sellers' advertising indicated was expected,
then the sale of the product has caused the injury. 27
This theory works well when the seller has used the marketing process to
mislead users and when someone is injured while using the product in its
normal manner. The theory, however, implies that the sale did not cause
the injury when the marketing material was silent on use of the product2
and when the user has misused or negligently used the product. A rule that
permits sellers to avoid liability whenever the plaintiff was negligent in the
use of the product would mean that contributory negligence is a complete
defense; a position which is rejected by all courts. 29 Some commentators
avoid this problem by eliminating cause-in-fact from the inquiry? 0 Professor
Green, for example, calls arguments based on "but for," "take your
eye off the ball" arguments."' His point appears to be that "but for" is a
worthless exercise because it forces the court to focus on something that did
not happen, rather than on something that did happen.12
By removing "but for" from the inquiry, Professor Green appears to
make causation purely a matter of policy. Causation is usually proved by
a two-part analysis.3 First, courts determine whether there is a factual
27. Green, supra note 26, at 1190-91 (discussing the representational theory of products
liability); Phillips, supra note 26, at 562-63 (explaining that the marketing of the product creates
the expectations of the ordinary consumer and such expectations determine the relevance of
plaintiffs action). Both professors agree with the representational theory first propounded by
Professor Shapo. See Shapo, A Representational Theory of Consumer Protection: Doctrine,
Function and Legal Liability for Product Disappointment, 60 VA. L. REv. 1109 (1974).
28. Those who favor the representational theory would probably dispute this idea, based
on the notion that all products come with an implied representation that they are safe for all
reasonable uses. The reasoning would be that the marketing is never silent.
29. Comment n to RESTATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states that contributory
negligence is not a defense to strict liability, but assumption of the risk is. For a general
description of how courts have applied comment n, see Epstein, Products Liability: Defenses
Based on Plaintiff's Conduct, 1968 UTAH L. REy. 267 (1968); Noel, Defective Products:
Abnormal Use, Contributory Negligence and Assumption of the Risk, 25 VAND. L. R.v. 93
(1972).
The recent trend has been to apply comparative fault instead of comment n. See, e.g., Daly
v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 740-41, 575 P.2d 1162, 1171, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
389 (1978) (the Daly court cited sixteen law review articles that favor the use of comparative
negligence in strict liability).
30. See, e.g., Green, Duties, Risks, Causation Doctrines, 41 TEx. L. Ry. 42, 68 (1962)(describing cause-in-fact arguments as "take your eye off the ball" arguments); Phillips, supra
note 26, at 571; Thode, The Indefensible Use of the Hypothetical Case to Determine Cause
in Fact, 46 TEx. L. REv. 423-35 (describing the "but for" test as misleading).
31. Green, supra note 30, at 68.
32. Professor Phillips explained Professor Green's reasoning as use of a situation that did
not occur to obscure the issue of causation. Phillips, supra note 26, at 571.
33. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 263-65. Professor Owen, supra note
26, at 777-78 stated:
In any discussion of the role of causation in tort law, it is helpful to isolate the
[Vol. 62:701
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relationship between the alleged cause and the result. This is usually done
by applying the "but for" test. If "but for" the alleged cause the injury
would not have occurred, then the alleged cause is a cause-in-fact of the
injury.3 4 If a cause-in-fact relationship exists, courts look to policy to de-
termine whether a particular factual cause should bear responsibility for the
injury, that is, whether it is the proximate cause. a5 Professor Green's theory,
by eliminating "but for" from the inquiry, would thus make causation
purely a matter of policy.
6
Professor Phillips agrees with Professor Green's reasoning on causation3 7
and makes clear that he views causation as purely a matter of policy by
stating that one should find causation whenever the reasonable consumer
would have been injured.3 8 By focusing on whether a reasonable person in
the position of the plaintiff would have been injured, Professor Phillips'
approach stretches causation well beyond its normal meaning. 39 In a "failure
to warn" case, a plaintiff who was fully aware of the danger and intentionally
ignored it, may collect if a reasonable person aware of the danger would
not have used the product. Professor Phillips would seem to hold that the
injury was caused by the sale of the product, just as the injury to an innocent,
unknowing consumer. One has ta ignore what really happened to conclude
that the sale caused the injury, especially where the purchaser intended to
use the product to injure and the seller had no reason to know that the
purchaser intended to cause injury. The intentional wrongdoer is a cause,
if not the cause, of the injury and therefore the wrongdoer's role should
not be ignored when trying to determine what caused the injury.
Professor Phillips suggests that defenses such as unforeseeable misuse and
assumption of the risk can prevent the intentional wrongdoer from col-
lecting. 40 This may be true, but it seems rather circuitous to create a problem
issue of cause in fact from that of proximate causation. While the two concepts
frequently overlap and are often treated indiscriminately by the courts, precise
analysis requires that they be examined separately.
34. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 41, at 266. See also A. BECHT & F. MILLER, THE
TEST OF FACTUAL CAUSATION (1969); H.L.A. HART & A. HoNoRE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW
(1959); Malone, Ruminations on Cause-In-Fact, 9 STA. L. Ray. 60 (1956).
35. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 42, at 72.
36. For a good discussion of the relationship between cause-in-fact and proximate cause,
see Wright, Actual Causation v. Probabilistic Linkage: The Bane of Economic Analysis, 14 J.
LEGAL STuD. 435 (1985) (arguing that the chief problem with economic theories of causation
is their omission of factual causation, leaving causation as purely a matter of policy).
Some courts and commentators have suggested a "substantial factor" test instead of the
"but for" test. Prosser and Keeton describe this as a test "concerning legal significance rather
than factual quantum." PROSSER & KE TON, supra note 10, § 41, at 267. This test is guided
by policy much more than by the "but for" test.
37. Phillips, supra note 26, at 571 (quoting Professor Green's article).
38. Id. at 574 (reasoning that reliance on the reasonably prudent consumer keeps the court's
focus appropriately on standards of conduct).
39. Professor Phillips is clearly aware that he is presenting a causation analysis that differs
from the traditional analysis. He argues that this is appropriate as a matter of policy. Id. at
561.
40. Id. at 575-80.
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by ignoring what actually happened and solve it later, when one could
prevent the problem by beginning his analysis with what actually happened.
Moreover, if multiple causes exist, it will be fairer to apportion damages
according to how much each contributed to the injury rather than to focus
on defenses.
Professor Phillips articulates a policy basis for focusing on what a rea-
sonable person would do rather than on what happened in the case at hand.4 '
He argues that the policies underlying products liability causes of action,
especially the policy of providing the manufacturer with incentives to produce
safer products, would be undermined if one focused on the plaintiff's con-
duct.42 Tort law has always had two sets of goals: the societal goals of
compensating injured parties and preventing injuries and the goals of fairness
between parties. The substantive elements of the cause of action in products
liability emphasize the societal goals. 43 Professor Phillips suggests that it
would frustrate the goals of products liability law to permit the causation
issue to focus on what happened in the case at hand. 44
Professor Phillips argues that the causation analysis should focus on the
societal rather than the individual level. In warning cases, this means that
because the defective warning is likely to have induced some sales and thus
increased the number of people injured by the product, the sale of the
product with the defective warning has caused injury. Since it will be very
difficult to determine which sales were induced by the defective warning,
the goals of compensation and risk avoidance can be best furthered by
providing a remedy to every purchaser whenever a reasonable purchaser
would not have purchased the product. Professor Phillips concludes that
one should not consider the individual case because to do so would require
speculation by the jury and would probably result in manufacturers paying
for fewer injuries than they caused. 4
Professor Phillips' reasoning leads to the conclusion that some plaintiffs
who ignored the warnings were injured because of an inadequate warning.
The reason for this result, according to Professor Phillips, is that the product
that lacks adequate warnings places all purchasers at greater risk, and there-
fore all who are injured by the product ought to be permitted to recover.4
41. Id. at 578-80. His reasoning implies that if the warning is inadequate, defendant is a
wrongdoer and it would be inappropriate to permit the wrongdoer to escape liability when so
many are at risk.
42. Id. at 579.
43. See, e.g., Bohlen, Affirmative Obligations in the Law of Torts (pts. 2 & 3), 53 U. PA.
L. Rav. 273 (1905) (discussing the two competing sets of goals).
Professor Phillips compares the refusal to look at causation in warning cases with the
exclusionary rule used in criminal cases. Phillips, supra note 26, at 579 n.66 (citing Mapp v.
Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 658-60 (1961) (evidence acquired by unlawful search and seizure cannot
be used in a criminal trial)).
44. Phillips, supra note 26, at 579.
45. Id. at 578.
46. Id. at 579 n.66 ("[t]he advantages of encouraging adequate warnings by holding the
defendant liable may outweigh the issue of the plaintiff's lack of awareness ... ").
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Similar reasoning has led many courts to adopt a "sale must cause injury"
rule in the form of a presumption of causation.
II. THE PRESUMPTION OF CAUSATION
A number of courts hold that in "failure to warn" cases plaintiffs can
take advantage of a presumption that the failure to warn caused the injury.47
This presumption is a subcategory of the "sale must cause injury" group
because it means that the plaintiff can prove causation by proving that the
injury resulted from the defendants' sale of the product. The case of Reyes
v. Wyeth Laboratories's illustrates this point.
In Reyes, plaintiff's daughter contracted polio shortly after receiving two
drops of oral polio vaccine manufactured by the defendant. The plaintiff
claimed that the vaccine was defective because it was not accompanied by
any warnings regarding the potential dangers associated with it. The jury
found for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed, arguing that the plaintiff
had failed to provide sufficient evidence that the failure to warn caused the
injury.49 The court of appeals affirmed the jury verdict, reasoning that in
"failure to warn" cases, a presumption arises that 'an adequate warning
would have been read and heeded.50 The court interpreted "read and heeded"
to mean that a person warned of the risk would not use the product." The
court reasoned that such a presumption was necessary because it would be
unfair to deny recovery when the plaintiff was injured as a result of using
a product marketed by the defendant in the manner suggested by the defend-
ant.52 Thus, although the court spoke in terms of the defect causing the
injury, the presumption effectively meant that if the sale caused the injury,
the court will find that the defect did cause the injury.
The Reyes court used the risk inherent in the product to establish the duty
to warn and to raise the presumption that the failure to warn caused the
injury. The court's conclusion on causation was thus based upon the prod-
uct's propensity to injure some users. The court was correct in using the
risk of injury to find a duty to warn. The gap in the court's reasoning,
however, lies in its use of the risk that the product will injure some users
47. See, e.g., Petty v. United States, 740 F.2d 1437 (8th Cir. 1983); Reyes v. Wyeth
Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Nissen Tram-
poline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat'l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (1975), rev'd on other grounds,
265 Ind. 457, 358 N.E.2d 974 (1976).
48. 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974).
49. Id. at 1270.
50. Id. at 1281-82. The court relied on the REsTATEmzNT (SEcoND) oF TORTS § 402A comment
j (1965), which states that "where warning is given, the seller may reasonably assume that it
will be read and heeded."
51. The court stated that one warned of the risk would "act to minimize the risks." 498
F.2d at 1281. With a product like this, the only way to reduce the risk is to avoid using the
product.
52. Id. at 1274-75.
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to establish that the failure to warn caused this injury. The court presumed
that whenever a duty to warn exists, one who is warned of the product's
propensity to injure will not use the product. 3 This presumption, however,
is likely to reach the wrong result. There are many products that have a
propensity to injure, and thus the manufacturers of these products have a
duty to warn. Yet many consumers find that the value of the product exceeds
those risks and purchase the product. The cancer warning on diet soft drinks
and the warning on cigarettes are two examples of warnings that are fright-
ening and yet have not impeded consumption. It is erroneous to use the
likelihood that a product will cause some injury to presume that the failure
to warn caused a particular injury.
This focus on the product's propensity to injure is also troubling because
it makes every products liability case a warning case, thereby removing the
causation element from all products liability cases. The Reyes court reasoned
that any time a product has a propensity to injure, the manufacturer has a
duty to warn. 54 Every product that is defectively designed or manufactured
has a propensity to injure. The manufacturer, therefore, has a duty to warn
in all such cases. Basing the presumption of causation on the product's
propensity to injure could thus make every products liability case a warning
case. Plaintiffs, consequently, would be wise to allege failure to warn along
with design and manufacturing defects in order to avoid the burden of
proving causation.
The presumption of causation effectively removes causation from the case
because saying that a reasonable person who is aware of the dangers will
not use the product is merely to say that the product is defective. The
Reyes court said that in warning cases one should assume that an adequate
warning would be read and heeded. The court interpreted this to mean that
a reasonable person who is aware of the danger would not use the product.
The Restatement states that a product is defective if it is more dangerous
than the reasonable consumer would expect.55 Many courts'define "defective
product" from the seller's perspective, namely, a product is defective if a
reasonable seller aware of the danger will not sell it.16 In either case, the
finding of a defect often implies that a reasonable person who is aware of
the defect will not use the product.5 7 The presumption of causation is thus
usually a repetition of the conclusion that the product is defective.
53. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
54. 498 F.2d at 1273.
55. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments g & i (1965).
56. See, e.g., Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 485, 525 P.2d 1033 n.5 (1974)
(citing Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825, 834-35
(1973)); Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning of "Defect" in the Manufacture and
Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969); Keeton, Products Liability-Some
Observations About Allocation of Risks, 64 MICH. L. REy. 1329, 1335 (1966).
57. This is implicit in the risk/utility analysis. A reasonably prudent person would not use
a product if the risks of use outweigh the benefits.
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When the presumption of causation is not a repetition of the conclusion
that the product is defective, its results are likely to be wrong. Some products
create such a slight risk of harm that they are not likely to be defective in
design. The vaccine in Reyes, for example, presented a risk of harm to fewer
than one person per million users .5 The plaintiff did not claim that this
risk of harm constituted a design defect because the usefulness of the product
greatly outweighed the risk of harm. The court used this non-defective
propensity to harm to conclude that the product was defective because of
the failure to warn, and that the failure to warn caused the injury. The
court presumed that the propensity to harm, which did not constitute a
design defect, would prevent the reasonable consumer who is aware of the
danger from purchasing the product. The court therefore assumed that the
propensity to harm, which the plaintiff did not claim to be a defect,
nonetheless constituted a defect. The court, in other words, presumed that
a risk that the plaintiff felt would not prevent people from purchasing the
product would have prevented the plaintiff from doing so.
Presumptions are usually based on the great probability that one set of
facts will follow from another. 9 A presumption is therefore stronger than
a reasonable inference. 6 In the case of the non-defective propensity to injure,
the risk is not likely to deter most users because if the risk were so great,
it would not be non-defective. If the risk would not deter most users, it is
not reasonable to infer that any individual would be deterred by knowledge
of the risk. In such cases, a presumption that all would be deterred is
extremely unfair.
If the warning is not likely to affect the plaintiff's action, and thus not
likely to be a cause of the injury, why do courts such as the Fifth Circuit
in Reyes use it? Three possible reasons come to mind. First, is the failure
to distinguish among the different types of warnings. Second, is the failure
to distinguish among different types of products liability cases. Third, is the
policy argument made by Professor Phillips.
There are two types of "failure to warn" cases: "failure to warn" cases
in which an adequate warning tells the user how to use the product safely
(e.g., "Flammable - Do Not Use Near Fire"), and "failure to warn" cases
in which the warning provides information about the risk but does not tell
the reader how to use the product and avoid the risk (e.g., "Cigarette
smoking may be hazardous to your health")." In the first type, the pre-
sumption that the warning would be heeded makes sense. Most people who
58. 498 F.2d at 1274.
59. See McCoiRcK oN EVIDENCE 969 (Cleary 3d ed. 1984).
60. Id. at 965.
61. Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation
Comes of Age, 61 CoRNELL L. Rv. 495, 519 (1976). Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d
691, 699, 677 P.2d 1140, 1152, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870, 875 (1984) is a case in which the court
properly distinguished the two types of warning cases.
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are aware of a risk and of a simple means of avoiding it will choose to
avoid it. In the second type of warning case, that is not true. The sole
purpose of such a warning is to permit the consumer to assess the risk and
decide whether or not to use the product. The existence of a class of warning
cases for which the presumption is reasonable, and a failure to recognize
different classes of warning cases, could thus lead courts to apply the pre-
sumption in all warning cases.
The failure to distinguish among different types of products liability cases
results from the fact that in most products liability cases causation is obvious.
In Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc.,6" for example, the alleged defect
was the wood lathe's propensity to shoot boards. When the plaintiff was
struck by one of the boards, the causal link between the defect and the
injury was not questioned. Indeed, whenever the risk created by the product
and the risk created by the alleged defect are the same, the plaintiff's proof
that the injury was caused by the risk of harm inherent in the product is
sufficient to prove causation. 61 In "failure to warn" cases, when the risk
created by the product and the risk created by the alleged defect are separable,
one might view the plaintiff's requirement of proof that the warning caused
the injury as a burden that the plaintiff should not have to carry because
other products liability plaintiffs are not required to do so. 64 This failure to
recognize that in some products liability cases the defect and the risk are
separable could lead courts to conclude that it is unfair to permit a defendant
whose product has caused injury to claim that the failure to warn did not.
The presumption of causation thus uses misconceptions regarding products
liability law to, in effect, remove causation from the case. The presumption
is often unfair because it will require manufacturers to pay for more injuries
than they caused. Also, basing causation on the reasonable user ignores
plaintiff's conduct, which is often an important factor in causing the injury.
Professor Phillips' presumption is less unfair than the presumption used
by the Reyes court. He would presume causation only when a reasonable
person aware of the danger would not use the product. He would not use
a presumption, therefore, when it would likely reach the wrong result . 6 His
theory, however, still requires some defendants to pay for injuries they did
not cause. He justifies this unfairness by arguing that the societal danger
created by hazardous products outweighs the unfairness to some individual
defendants.
62. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962).
63. Cf. R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS 3, 10 (1963) (suggesting that liability
should result only when the injury is within the risk created by defendant's tortious conduct).
64. Professor Green certainly sees it as an additional burden. See supra note 30 and
accompanying text; see also Green, supra note 26, at 1211.
65. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text. If the reasonable consumer would avoid
use of the product, the presumption will reach the correct result in most cases, but clearly not
in all cases.
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Professor Phillips' reasoning is similar to the reasoning that Judge Weinstein
rejected in In re Agent Orange Product Liability Litigation.6 The plaintiffs
in the Agent Orange case argued that the risk created by Agent Orange was
sufficient proof of both the dangerousness of the product and the causal
relationship between the product and the injuries. Judge Weinstein rejected
this theory, claiming that it confused the tort system with government reg-
ulatory systems. Regulators, he noted, can take action based on a slight risk
to the public. The tort system, however, requires greater risk and will not
deem a product dangerous unless it is more likely than rbt that it causes
injury. In addition, proof that a product causes injury is never sufficient to
prove that the product caused injury to any particular individual.6 7 As a
result, the existence of risk to society in general is never sufficient to find
tort liability. To find such liability, Judge Weinstein concluded, would violate
the basic principle that "the law believes it unfair to require an individual
to pay for another's tragedy unless it is shown that it is more likely than
not that he caused it. ' ' 8
Professor Phillips and Judge Weinstein are correct in recognizing that the
question of what causes injury is difficult when several possible causes exist.
Both err, however, in assuming that courts will reach the most equitable
result by choosing from one of the several causes. The upcoming discussion
of comparative causation will show that courts can reach more equitable
results in cases with multiple causes by apportioning the damages according
to the causal impact of each tortious cause.6 9
III. DEFECTIVE CONDITION AS CAUSE OF INJURY
Many courts hold that in strict products liability the defective condition
66. 597 F. Supp. 740, 781 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). See also Elliott, Goal Analysis versus Insti-
tutional Analysis of Toxic Compensation Systems, 73 GEo. L.J. 1357, 1374 (1985).
67. 597 F. Supp. at 780-83. Professor Elliott agrees with the above distinction, but sees
three possible systems of recovery: the tort system, an administrative system and legislation.
He sees the "evidentiary requirements" for case by case litigation as more demanding than the
other two, but recognizes that the "evidentiary requirements" for administrative action can
vary greatly. Elliott, supra note 66, at 1374.
68. 597 F. Supp. at 781. Judge Weinstein cited the following authorities for that proposition:
See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 189 N.J. Super. 561, 461 A.2d 184, 187 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Law Div. 1983) (increased risk of exposure to contaminated water not
enough for tort liability because of "speculative" nature of proof); Pierce v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 296 Md. 656, 464 A.2d 1020, 1026 (1983) (applying
50% probability rule to asbestos exposure). See generally ALI-ABA, Symposium
on Environmental Law sponsored by the Environmental Law Institute and the
Smithsonian Institute, February 23-25, 1984, Washington, D.C.; Grad, Hazardous
Waste Victim Compensation: The Report of the § 301(e) Superfund Study Group,
13 Envtl. L. Rep. 10234 (1983); Office of Science and Technology Policy, Chemical
Carcinogens: Review of the Science and Its Associated Principles, 49 Fed. Reg.
21594, 21596 (1984); D.G. Barnes, Regulatory Actions in Dioxins and Related
Compounds, in R.E. Tucker, A.L. Young & A.P. Gray, Human and Environ-
mental Risks of Chlorinated Dioxins and Related Compounds 23-31 (1983).
Id.
69. See infra notes 150-60 and accompanying text.
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of the product must cause injury. This rule easily avoids the overbreadth
problem illustrated by Price v. Ashby's.70 This rule also fits in well with the
move from negligence to strict products liability. Negligence cases focus on
the defendant's action: did the defendant act negligently and, if so, did the
negligent act cause the plaintiff's injury? The move from negligence to strict
products liability shifts the focus from the defendant's action to the condition
of the product: 7' was the product defective? When the focus of the case
shifts from the defendant's action to the condition of the product, it seems
logical to change what must cause injury from the defendant's action to the
condition of the product.
The rule that the defective condition must cause injury also has an intuitive
appeal. One would not complain about the condition of a product unless
he felt that the problem with the product caused the injury. Moreover, in
most products liability cases, the relationship between the alleged defect and
the injury is obvious. The product is found to be defective because it has
the propensity to cause the injury that occurred. In Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., where the plaintiff was injured by an exploding Coke bottle,
the defect was whatever made the bottle likely to explode. In Greenman v.
Yuba Power Products, Inc.," where the plaintiff was hit by boards shot out
of a wood lathe, the defect was whatever made the lathe shoot out the
boards. In such cases it is difficult to raise the question of what must cause
injury.
The weakness in the "defective condition must cause injury" rule, how-
ever, is that it is underinclusive. There are cases in which the defect may
not have caused the injury, but, because the defendant's product has caused
injury, one may want to hold the defendant responsible for the injury.
Reyese4 and Cunningham75 may be examples of this type of case. In these
cases, both defendants manufactured products that contained a risk of injury
70. 11 Utah 2d 54, 354 P.2d 1064 (1960).
71. The court in Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co. stated: "In a strict liability case we are
talking about the condition (dangerousness) of an article which is sold without any warning,
while in negligence we are talking about the reasonableness of the manufacturer's actions in
selling the article without a warning." 269 Or. 485, 498, 525 P.2d 1033, 1039 (1974).
Some commentators have argued that the shift in focus from the defendant's action to the
condition of the product is the main reason for strict liability. Plaintiffs are often unable to
prove acts of negligence, but proving a defect is possible and should be sufficient to find the
manufacturer liable. See, e.g., Calabresi, Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law
of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499 (1961); Keeton, Products Liability-Liability Without Fault and
the Requirement of a Defect, 41 TEx. L. REv. 855 (1963); Shapo, supra note 27.
72. 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944). The court used res ipsa loquitur to find negligence
on the part of the manufacturer. Justice Traynor, concurring, argued that the product was
defective and that the defect ought to be a sufficient basis for liability. Id. at 461, 150 P.2d
at 440.
73. 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (the court found that a defect
in design caused the wood lathe to shoot boards).
74. Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1096 (1974).
75. Cunningham v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377 (Okla. 1975).
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to some users. In each case the normal use of the product resulted in injury
to an innocent user, who subsequently sued the manufacturer of the product.
It is difficult to see why the causation issue is any different here than in
Escola and Greenman.
The causation issue in the warning cases is different because the alleged
defect and the product's propensity to injure appear to be separate. The
design of the product is what makes the product likely to injure, while the
alleged defect is the way the product is marketed. 76 This is true in all warning
cases where the purpose of the warning is to permit consumers to make an
informed choice about the use of the product. When the product's propensity
to injure and the alleged defect are different, one might assume that the
plaintiff does not believe that the product's propensity to injure is a defect
in the product. It may be, for example, that the risk of getting polio from
the vaccine is so slight that the risk would not constitute a design defect in
the vaccine. Those courts that find no causation when the product's pro-
pensity to injure caused the injury, but the defective warning did not, could
be reasoning that if the propensity to injure is not a defect, it is not relevant
in determining responsibility for the injury.
Because tort law requires more than a showing of causation to create lia-
bility, 77 innocent causes are not usually considered when one is trying to
determine liability.78 Refusing to consider the non-defective propensity to
injure when determining the cause of injury in "failure to warn" cases,
however, may be erroneous for two reasons. First, the plaintiff's description
of the defect should not be permitted to control the determination of whether
the propensity to injure is innocent. Second, the propensity to injure and
the defect may not actually be separable.
If the plaintiffs description of the defect can determine whether the
propensity to injure is innocent, the result will be an increase in the number
of types of defects alleged by plaintiffs. Section 402A of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts speaks of defective conditions without ever describing
types of defective conditions. 79 Since the adoption of section 402A, however,
courts have recognized three distinct types of defects: manufacturing defects,
76. In Reyes, for example, the product design that was likely to cause injury was the use
of the live polio virus in the vaccine. The alleged defect was the failure to warn. The live polio
virus unquestionably caused the injury; whether the failure to warn caused the injury was a
difficult question. 498 F.2d at 1264.
77. In products liability, courts require sale of a defective product, or negligence, in addition
to causation. One commentator has suggested that a rule of strict liability ought to be based
solely on proof of causation. See Epstein, supra note 4.
78. Cf. Twerski, The Many Faces of Misuse: An Inquiry Into the Emerging Doctrine of
Comparative Causation, 29 MERCER L. REv. 403, 435 (1978) (questioning whether a non-
culpable cause can be considered in apportioning damages among causes). See also Wright,
supra note 4 (arguing that only the tortious aspect of defendant's conduct ought to be con-
sidered).
79. See generally REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A & official comments (1965). No
mention is made of types of defects.
1987]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
design defects and marketing or warning defects. 0 While courts have not
yet gone beyond these three types of defects, nothing prevents them from
doing so in the future.
If strict products liability is described as selling a product that contains
an unreasonable risk, or selling a product that contains a greater risk than
a reasonable consumer would expect, the development of a design/marketing
defect seems reasonable. In some cases, the risk inherent in the design of a
product is not great enough to constitute a defect. Yet the marketing scheme,
while not creating a new risk of injury, enhances the existing risk either by
not warning of, or by misrepresenting, the level of risk. As a result of the
marketing scheme, then, the risk inherent in the product is unreasonable or
greater than the reasonable consumer would expect."' In this case there may
not be a design defect, but there is a marketing and a design/marketing
defect; design/marketing, because the risk inherent in the design, while not
sufficient to be called a defect, is a part of the marketing defect. It would
seem, then that creative pleadings that add to the number of types of defects
could overcome the problem created by the "defect must cause injury" rule.
The description of the design/marketing defect should make clear that the
product's propensity to injure cannot always be separated from the marketing
defect. The marketing defect could not exist without this propensity to injure,
and a product with a marketing defect is dangerous only because of the
combination of the propensity to injure and the marketing problem. It is
thus erroneous to treat this propensity to injure that is not a defect as if it
were irrelevant. The "defect must cause injury" rule leads courts to treat
these non-defective, injury-causing factors as if they were irrelevant. This
rule consequently leads courts to omit from the causation discussion that
aspect of the product that had the most to do with causing injury.
The "defect must cause injury" rule will reach fair results in most cases.
Some modification of the rule is needed, however, to avoid the unfairness
that results from requiring courts to treat a product's inherent propensity
to injure as irrelevant.
The design/marketing defect is not likely to remedy this problem because
it will be viewed as problematic by both the plaintiffs' and defendants' bars,
who would like to see the product's propensity to injure as irrelevant. The
80. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 99, at 695 (listing the three types of
defects). Dean Wade has suggested that the three types of defects corresponds to the three
actions that the plaintiffs alleged to be the basis of the manufacturer's negligence-negligence
in manufacture, negligence in design and negligence in failure to warn. Wade, supra note 56,
at 836-37.
81. Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 424 N.E.2d 568 (1981)
illustrates this point. Plaintiffs sought recovery for enhanced injuries sustained when the Jeep
CJ-7 they were passengers in rolled over. The court used defendant's advertising to find that
the design was unreasonably dangerous. The CJ-7 was advertised as a rugged vehicle, safe for
off-road use. Television advertisements showed the CJ-7 being driven in a dangerous manner
similar to the way that plaintiff drove it. The advertisements increased the risk of injury from
the product. Id.
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defendants' bar wants to view the propensity to injure as irrelevant because,
as such, plaintiffs will have a great deal of difficulty proving causation in
"failure to warn" cases. The plaintiffs' bar .wants to view the propensity to
injure as irrelevant because examination of the overall merits of the product
is often likely to shed favorable light on the manufacturer.
The dispute regarding the relevance of the propensity to injure is a man-
ifestation of the continuing debate over the scope of the manufacturer's duty
in strict liability. The issue is whether the manufacturer has a duty to:
(I) make a defect-free product;
(2) make a defect-free product or warn of any factors that may be
defective; or
(3) make a defect-free product and warn of any potential risks.
The plaintiffs' bar is likely to choose answer 3. The defendants' bar is likely
to choose answer 2. The above analysis, by showing that the product and
the warning cannot really be separated, leads to answer 1.
IV. THE PRODUCT AS CAUSE OF INJURY
A rule that requires the product to be the cause of the injury82 would
avoid both the overbreadth of the "sale must cause injury" rule and the
underinclusiveness of the "defect must cause injury" rule. The overbreadth
problem would be avoided in the same way that the "defect must cause
injury" rule avoided it, and the underinclusiveness problem would be avoided
by using all the risks inherent in the product to determine whether the
product caused the injury. The rule, however, has been criticized for not
making clear what must cause injury and for being too pro-plaintiff. The
most common criticism of the "product must cause injury" rule is that it
does not appear to require that there be something wrong with the product.83
And if it does require that something wrong with the product cause the
injury, critics ask: how does this rule differ from a rule that requires that
the defect (something wrong with the product) cause the injury? The rule
also is seen as pro-plaintiff because if the plaintiff can prove causation
without proving a defect, it will be very difficult for the defendants to show
that this product that caused the injury is not somehow defective. 84
82. The California Supreme Court adopted such a rule in Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,
8 Cal. 3d 121, 133, 501 P.2d 1153, 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442 (1972) (stating that a seller
"should be [held] liable for all injuries proximately caused by any of its products .. ."). The
rule was modified in Barker v. Lull Engineering Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal.
Rptr. 225 (1978). Pennsylvania uses a similar rule. See infra notes 120-25 and accompanying
text.
83. See, e.g., Fischer, Products Liability-The Meaning of Defect, 39 Mo. L. Rsv. 339
(1974); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST. MaRy's L.J. 30 (1973);
Wade, supra note 56.
84. See, e.g., R. EPsTmN, MoDER PRODUcTS LiAm irrY LAW 80-85 (1980) (arguing that
Barker v. Will Engineering makes every product-related injury presumptively actionable). Cf.
Schwartz, Forward: Understanding Products Liability, 67 CALIF. L. Rv. 435, 469 (1979)
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The California Supreme Court has made several attempts at fashioning a
"product must cause injury" rule. In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,85 the
plaintiff objected to jury instructions that defined "defect" as anything that
made the product "unreasonably dangerous." The court agreed, reasoning that
"unreasonably dangerous" sounded like negligence and not strict liability.
The court concluded that the rule in strict liability cases should be that a
seller "should be liable for all injuries proximately caused by any of [his]
products which are adjudged 'defective'.1"86 The only attempt made by the
Cronin court to define "defect" came in a footnote that stated that the
"cluster of useful precedents" could provide a sufficient basis for deciding
which products were defective.8 7 The commentary on Cronin was mostly
critical and generally complained that the court had failed to provide any
definition of the term "defect."
In Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.," the California Supreme Court again
addressed the question of definition of "defect" and again included causation
in its definition.' 9 The court stated that "a product is defective ... if the
plaintiff proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and the
defendant fails to prove ... that on balance the benefits of the challenged
design outweigh the risk inherent in such design." ' 9° The Barker rule thus
provides that the first step in proving a defect is proof of causation, and
proof of causation then shifts the burden to the defendant to prove that
the benefits of the design outweigh the risks.
Most commentary on Barker focuses on the shifting of the burden of
proof.9' One commentator argues that the shift in the burden of proof is
(arguing that because plaintiffs will generally be interested in getting their cases before the jury
first, Barker may have given plaintiffs a right that most willdecline to exercise).
85. 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972).
86. Id. at 133-34, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. In addition to sounding too
much like negligence, the court rejected "unreasonably dangerous" because it appears to place
an extra burden on the plaintiff: the burden of proving unreasonable danger in addition to
the burden of proving defect. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 443.
87. Id. at 134, 501 P.2d at 1162, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 442. In footnote 16 the court stated:
We recognize, of course, the difficulties inherent in giving content to the defec-
tiveness standard. However, as Justice Traynor notes, "there is now a cluster of
useful precedents to supersede the confusing decisions based on indiscriminate
invocation of sales and warranty law." (Traynor, [The Ways and Meanings of
Defective Products and Strict Liability], 32 TENN. L. REv. 363, 373 [(1965)].
Id.
88. 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978).
89. The trial court had instructed the jury that to be defective, a product must be "un-
reasonably dangerous" and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the Cronin decision made clear
that such an instruction was erroneous. Id. at 417, 573 P.2d at 446, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 228.
90. Id. at 435, 573 P.2d at 457-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. The court explained that
Cronin had made clear that "defect" may be defined differently in different contexts and that
"unreasonably dangerous" may be an appropriate instruction for a manufacturing flaw. Id.
at 427, 573 P.2d at 452, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 234. The court then adopted a risk/utility based
rule for design defects. Id. at 434, 573 P.2d at 457, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239, relying on Wade,
supra note 56, at 831.
91. See, e.g., Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L.
REv. 643 (1978); Schwartz, supra note 84.
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grossly unfair because it makes every product presumptively defective. 92
Others argue that the defendant should have the burden of proof because
the defendant usually has greater resources and greater access to the design
evidence. 93 Although most commentators analyze this burden of proof issue
without attempting to explain what "design proximately caused injury"
means, it seems that whether the burden shifting is fair depends in large
part on how one interprets "design proximately caused injury."
Those who find the Barker rule to be unfair to defendants invariably
interpret "design proximately caused injury" to require a very slight showing
of causation. One commentator suggests that under Barker, one who cuts
himself with a bread knife could get to a jury by alleging that the knife was
defectively designed because it was sharp. 94 Sharpness of the knife can be
seen as the cause of the injury because "but for" the sharpness, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. The defendant would thus have the burden
of proving that its design of the knife was risk beneficial. This argument
assumes that the plaintiff's burden of proving causation is very slight and
that the plaintiff's burden does not include some showing that a feasible
alternative exists.
The assumption that all plaintiffs can get to the jury without any showing
of a feasible alternative design has some case support. A better reading of
the cases that follow Barker, however, provides that plaintiffs who are
attacking a product for which the jury is not likely to be aware of the
existence of a feasible alternative must provide evidence of a feasible alter-
native or they will fail on the causation issue. A comparison of Campbell
v. General Motors Corp.," and Garcia v. Joseph Vince Co.,96 reveals why
some plaintiffs will fail to show causation if they cannot show a feasible
alternative design.
Campbell is the leading case for the proposition that the plaintiff need
not show a feasible alternative design. Ms. Campbell was injured when a
92. Epstein, supra note 91, at 651. Professor Epstein states that:
The careful division of burdens in the second portion of the [Barker] test says
that plaintiff need only show design features that might be implicated in the
accident, leaving it to the defendant, at great expense, routinely to justify each
feature as best he can. With this distribution of burden, the plaintiff can alvays
show some way in which the product might have been changed in order to avert
the accident, as it is always possible to generate some improvement at some
price.... Complicated products create the greatest concern, as multiple defects
can easily be invented by a skillful lawyer. All product related accidents have
become presumptively actionable.
Id.
93. The Alaska Supreme Court, in Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871 (Alaska
1979), saw this as a form of res ipsa loquitur. The court reasoned that the burden of proof
shifts whenever the defendant had control of it. In a design defect case, the defendant never
gives up control of the design of the product, hence it is always appropriate to shift the burden
of proof. Id. at 886. See also supra text accompanying note 56.
94. Epstein, supra note 91, at 651.
95. 32 Cal. 3d 112, 649 P.2d 224, 184 Cal. Rptr. 891 (1982).
96. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
19871
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL[ 6
bus in which she was riding took a sharp turn at a high speed, throwing
her to the floor. She claimed that the bus was defectively designed because
it did not have a bar to grab when the vehicle was rounding sharp curves.
The only evidence the plaintiff provided was her description of the event
and pictures of the bus; the trial court granted the defendant's motion for
a nonsuit.97 The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that in order
to shift the burden under Barker, the plaintiff need only provide facts from
which the jury could infer that the design of the product caused the injury.98
In Garcia,99 the trial court nonsuited a fencer who claimed that a defect
in his fencing mask had caused him to be struck in the eye with a blade.
The nonsuit was based in part on plaintiff's failure to provide any evidence
that a different mask design would have prevented this injury.'0' The Garcia
court's reasoning is not clear, however, and its decision to require the plaintiff
to show a feasible alternative has been criticized for being inconsistent with Barker.' °'
Garcia, however, could be consistent with Barker in requiring plaintiff to
show a feasible alternative design, because without some evidence of a
feasible alternative, the jury would be unable to infer that "but for" that
design, the injury would not have occurred. Garcia, therefore, could mean
that while Barker makes clear that a feasible alternative design is part of
proving defectiveness and therefore not part of the plaintiff's prima facie
case, some plaintiffs will have to show a feasible alternative, not as part of
defectiveness, but in order to raise the inference of proximate cause.
The distinction between Campbell and Garcia rests on what a jury could
infer from the plaintiff's evidence. In Campbell, the plaintiff showed pictures
of the bus. Some seats had "grab bars" or "hand rails" while others did
not. A person with no special knowledge of bus design could infer that
providing "grab bars" or "hand rails" for all seats might have prevented
the accident. 0 2 In Garcia, the plaintiff provided no evidence that a better
mask could have prevented the injury and no evidence from which a jury
could have inferred the possibility of making a better mask.'03 If the plaintiff
provides no evidence that a feasible alternative is possible, the jury lacks
97. 32 Cal. 3d at 117, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 893-94. General Motors contended
that plaintiff had failed to introduce evidence sufficient to establish that the bus was defective
in design or that the alleged defect was the proximate cause of her injuries. Id.
98. 32 Cal. 3d at 119, 649 P.2d at 228, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 895.
99. 84 Cal. App. 3d 868, 148 Cal. Rptr. 843 (1978).
100. Id. at 877-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49. The court stated that plaintiff must prove
defective design, proper use of the product, proximate cause and that reasonable alternative
designs are available. Id.
101. The court's statement that plaintiff must prove defective design is clearly inconsistent
with Barker. Moreover, Barker listed feasible alternative designs as an element to be considered
in determining whether a product is defective. See Note, Manufacturers' Strict Liability for
Injuries from a Well-Made Handgun, 24 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 467, 488-90 (1983) (rejecting
Garcia as totally inconsistent with Barker).
102. 32 Cal. 3d at 116, 649 P.2d at 226, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 893.
103. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 877-79, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49 (defendant contended that no
design of the mask could have prevented the illegal blade from causing the injury).
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evidence from which it can infer that "but for" the design of the product,
this injury would not have occurred.
The Campbell court made this distinction clear in its discussion of Truman
v. Vargas'0" and McNeil v. Yellow Cab Co. 0 5 In McNeil, the court held that
no expert testimony was required for the jury to find that failure to wear
a seatbelt was a cause of the plaintiff's injuries.106 The Truman court, in
contrast, held that expert testimony was required to prove that failure to
wear a seatbelt caused injury to one who was injured in a car that crashed
while moving at approximately forty miles per hour. °7 The Campbell court
found that its case was more like McNeil than Truman because a lay person
could understand the need for a "grab bar" much more easily than that
person could determine whether a seatbelt could have been helpful in a high
speed crash. 10 Thus, whether a plaintiff needs evidence of a feasible
alternative to prove causation is determined by whether a jury could infer
causation without such evidence.
Another distinction between Campbell and Garcia could be based on the
intended or reasonably foreseeable use of the product. The Garcia nonsuit
was based in part on the use of a non-regulation blade.1 9 The use of a blade
that was sharp enough to pierce any mask constituted an unintended or
unforeseeable use of the product. In Campbell, on the other hand, the court
reasoned that the jury should be permitted to determine the facts because
the plaintiff was injured while using the product in an intended or foreseeable
manner."10 Garcia and Campbell consequently indicate that use of the product
in a manner that is unintended or unforeseeable can provide another basis
for finding that the plaintiff failed to provide sufficient evidence that the
product caused the injury.
In Korli v. Ford Motor Co.,' misuse of the product prevented the plain-
tiff's allegation of design defect from going to the jury. In Korli, a child
was injured when she opened a rear-hinged car door while the car was
moving. The plaintiff claimed that the design of the car caused the injuries
because the car's rear-hinged doors made the car doors more likely to fly
open. The court of appeals affirmed the nonsuit, reasoning that the plaintiff's
use of the product (opening the door), not any design feature of the door,
104. 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969).
105. 85 Cal. App. 3d 116, 147 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1978).
106. Id. at 118, 147 Cal. Rptr. at 735. The court said that proximate cause of plaintiff's
claimed injuries in that case was a matter of "such common knowledge that persons of ordinary
education could reach an intelligent answer." Id.
107. 275 Cal. App. 2d at 983, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 377 (stating that because of the great force
of the collision "the nonexpert could only guess" at what would have happened).
108. 32 Cal. 3d at 125, 649 P.2d at 231-32, 124 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
109. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 878, 148 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
110. 32 Cal. 3d at 126, 649 P.2d at 232, 184 Cal. Rptr. at 899.
111. 84 Cal. App. 3d at 895; Prod. Liab. Rep. (CCH) § 8340 (1978-79). The full text of
the opinion is available only in the CCH Products Liability Reporter because the California
Supreme Court, in an order affirming the decision in Korli, ordered that the case be removed
from the California Appellate Reports.
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was the cause of the injury.112 The plaintiff in Korli failed to show that the
product caused the injury because she used the product in such a way that
no design of the product could have prevented the injury. Korli thus illus-
trates a second means of preventing a case from going to the jury under
Barker. If the plaintiffs use of the product would have caused the injury
regardless of the design of the product, then the design of the product was
not the proximate cause of the injury.
Campbell and Korli combine to show that the plaintiffs use of the product
is an important consideration when trying to determine whether a product
caused injury. If the plaintiff's use indicates that the product could not have
prevented this injury, then the product was not a cause of the injury.
This rule seems to have guided the plaintiff's pleadings and the court's
decision in Bates v. John Deere Co. "3 Mr. Bates was injured while operating
a cotton picking machine. When a stone got caught in the spindles which
remove the cotton from the stalks, Mr. Bates tried to remove it with his
foot. His foot became caught in the spindles, causing him serious injury.
Mr. Bates sued the manufacturer, claiming that the cotton picking machine
should have had a cutoff switch at ground level to reduce the seriousness
of the injuries of those who become caught in the spindles." 4 The key
element of his claim was that the failure to include such a device exacerbated,
but did not cause, the injuries."' Mr. Bates could not claim that the product
caused the injury because he admitted that no design of the product could
prevent people from getting their feet caught in the spindles. Thus, because
use of the product is an important factor in determining whether the product
caused the injury, the plaintiff could only claim that the design aggravated
his injuries, not that it caused them. The court recognized this distinction
when it concluded that the "evidence overwhelmingly establishes a causal
relationship between the absence of a cutoff switch near the picking heads
and the seriousness of the injury suffered by plaintiff. 1 16
The "product must cause injury" rule must mean that before making the
determination of whether the product is defective, the plaintiff must prove
that some aspect of the product caused the injury. The plaintiff's use of
the product is an important factor in determining what caused the injury.
If the plaintiff's act would have caused the injury regardless of the condition
of the product, the plaintiff could not show that the product caused the
112. Id. at § 8340. The court found that the doors performed exactly as intended and that
the proximate cause of the injury was the opening of the door while the vehicle was moving.
Id.
113. 148 Cal. App. 3d 40, 195 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1983).
114. Id. at 44-47, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 639-42. Plaintiff's doctor and numerous other witnesses
testified that a cutoff switch would greatly reduce the injuries of people who get caught in the
machine. Id. at 47, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
115. Id. at 47, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 642.
116. Id. at 50, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 644 (emphasis added).
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injury. 17 Plaintiffs who claim design defects will now have to provide expert
testimony concerning a feasible alternative design, because without such
testimony they will be unable to show that the design of the product caused
the injury.
The California "product must cause injury" rule is coupled with a rule
that requires defendants to prove that the product is not defective."' Penn-
sylvania, by contrast, uses a form of the "product must cause injury" rule
that does not require defendants to prove non-defectiveness. Because the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court defines "defect" as anything that causes injury,"19
the court must determine the cause of the injury before looking at whether
the product is defective. Although Pennsylvania courts claim that the defect
must cause the injury, their use of causation to define "defect" therefore
makes their rule closer to the "product must cause injury" rule.
Pennsylvania's experience with the "product must cause injury" rule clar-
ifies how focusing on what happened in this case can avoid the unfairness
created by presumed causation rules, while permitting plaintiffs to take
advantage of all risks created by the product. In Dambacher v. Mallis,120
the plaintiff claimed that tires sold by the defendant were defective because
the defendant failed to warn of the danger of using radial and non-radial
tires at the same time. The court used both the danger created by mixing
tires and the danger created by the failure to warn to determine whether
the product caused injury.'2' The court then concluded that lack of causation
made it unnecessary to determine whether there was a defect, because "in
the absence of proof of causation, appellant's radial tire could not be found
defective." '2 All the risks created by the product were thus used to determine
what caused the injury, and the court viewed proof of causation as a
prerequisite to proving defect.
In Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 2 1 where the plaintiff claimed
117. The California Supreme Court made this clear in Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal.
3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1984). In Finn, plaintiff claimed that failure to
warn that a drug could cause blindness caused his eye injuries. The court looked to plaintiff's
use of the product and concluded that because plaintiff continued to use the product after
becoming aware of the potential eye problems, plaintiff could not prove causation. Id. at 702,
677 P.2d at 1155, 210 Cal. App. at 877.
118. See supra notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
119. Azzarello v. Black Brothers Co., 480 Pa. 547, 391 A.2d 1020 (1978) ("[T]he jury may
find a defect where the product left the supplier's control lacking any element necessary to
make it safe for its intended use or possessing any feature that renders it unsafe for the intended
use."). Id. at 559, 391 A.2d at 1027. See also Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa.
83, 100-01, 337 A.2d 893, 902 (1975).
120. 336 Pa. Super. 22, 485 A.2d 408 (1984).
121. Id. at 45, 485 A.2d at 420. The court first examined the extent of the danger created
by mixing tires to see if mixing tires could have caused the injury. The court then looked to
whether the failure to warn of this danger could have caused the injury. Id.
122. Id. The court reasoned that a danger that does not cause injury cannot make the product
defective. This is true especially when the alleged defect is failure to warn. Courts do not want
to impose a duty to warn when a warning would not help prevent injury. Id. See also Sherk
v. Daisy-Heddon, 498 Pa. 594, 450 A.2d 615 (1982).
123. 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975).
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that a helicopter autorotation system was defectively designed and that the
manufacturer had failed to warn users about the system, all the product's
risks were again used to determine what caused the injury. 24 The court also
emphasized the importance of the plaintiff's conduct in causing the injury,
stating that "[ijf the jury were to conclude, for example, that a non-defective
system would allow two seconds for autorotation and that the decedent did
not attempt autorotation for three seconds ... it [the product] could not
have been the proximate cause of the crash."'' 2  By focusing on causation
before defectiveness, the court made clear that a plaintiff's actions can
prevent a product from causing injury even if there is a failure to warn.
Had the court focused on defectiveness first, and found a warning defect,
that increased the likelihood that this accident would occur, it is unlikely
that any jury, even one not told to presume causation, could have focused
sufficiently on what happened in this case to find that the defect did not
cause this injury.
V. USE OF THE PRODUCT: CAUSE OR DEFENSE
The plaintiff's use of the product has traditionally been used as a defense
in products liability actions. 26 Most jurisdictions provide some sort of defense
based on misuse of the product. Most jurisdictions also recognize the plain-
tiff's negligence as either a defense or a reason for diminution of damages.' 27
Treating use of the product as a part of the causation issue, however, has
a number of advantages over these defenses.
The first advantage is simplicity. In the previous discussion of the "sale
as cause" rule, it was noted that the rule tended to find causation regardless
of how the product was used. Proponents of the rule defend it by claiming
that the unfairness of finding causation when, for example, the plaintiff
124. Id. at 100-01, 337 A.2d at 902. The court examined a number of possible causes and
concluded that a product is defective if the manufacturer fails to "provide with the product
every element necessary to make it safe for use." Id. (emphasis added).
125. Id. at 99, 337 A.2d at 901. The court did not require the plaintiff's use to be negligent
or a knowing assumption of the risk before it could break the chain of causation. Id.
126. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) provides that contrib-
utory negligence is not a defense, but that knowing assumption of the risk is. Comment n
indicates that a product is not defective if the danger results from abnormal use of the product.
See also Epstein, supra note 29; Noel, supra note 29.
127. Even though the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) states that
contributory negligence should not be a defense, there is a strong trend toward the use of
comparative negligence in strict liability cases. Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725,
740-42, 575 P.2d 1166, 1171, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 389 (1978), the case in which California
adopted comparative negligence, cited 16 law review articles that favored the use of comparative
negligence. Among the better articles on the use of comparative negligence in strict liability
cases are: Fischer, Products Liability-Applicability of Comparative Negligence, 43 Mo. L.
REv. 431 (1978); Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171
(1974); Twerski, The Use and Abuse of Comparative Negligence in Products Liability, 10 IND.
L. REV. 797 (1977); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiffs Fault-The Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978).
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intentionally misused the product, is avoided by treating use of the product
as a defense.2 8 This, in effect, creates a two-step analysis when one would
do. First, the court finds that there was causation. Then, the court looks
at what happened and decides that the use of the product gives the plaintiff
a defense. It would be much simpler to look at use of the product as part
of causation and thus eliminate a step from the analysis.
Considering use of the product as part of causation is also conceptually
more sound. A defense is normally something that negates the plaintiff's
cause of action or justifies the defendant's action. 29 If the defendant proves
the defense of consent, then a battery did not occur. If the defendant proves
the truth of the statements, there was no libel. 30 Misuse of a product,
however, does not prevent the product from being defective. Assume that
the plaintiff, driving a car with defective brakes, fails to stop at a light and
crashes at an intersection. Assume also that the manufacturer can show that
the brakes had nothing to do with the accident because the plaintiff was
driving at one hundred miles per hour and did not attempt to brake until
ten feet before the intersection. In this case, the plaintiff's misuse of the
product, not the bad brakes, caused the injury. The brakes, however, remain
defective.' 3' The claim of misuse, therefore, challenges the plaintiff's de-
scription of what caused the injury. It does not render the product non-
defective.
Misuse of the product is only a defense if the misuse was unforeseeable.3 2
The focus is on the defendant's state of mind. While the defendant's state
of mind may be an important element in determining liability, there is no
reason to permit the defendant's state of mind to control the nature and
effect of the plaintiff's actions. In Cepeda v. Cumberland Engineering Co.,'33
the plaintiff claimed that the cause of his injury was the defendant's failure
to provide a guard that could not be removed, and the manufacturer claimed
that removal of the guard caused the injury. The court's decision therefore
hinged on the manufacturer's state of mind. The court reasoned that if the
removal of the guard was not foreseeable, then it was the cause of the
injury; if the removal of the guard was foreseeable, it was not relevant to
determine what caused this injury. 34 The defendant's state of mind was used
128. See supra notes 37-46 and accompanying text.
129. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 10, § 9, at 422.
130. Id. at § 116, at 839-41.
131. It is a basic principle of products liability law that defect is determined by examining
the product. Plaintiff's use of the product cannot make the product safe. But see Schwartz,
supra note 127, at 172 (suggesting that misuse of the product can be used to determine that
the product was safe).
132. See, e.g., Bryan v. John Bean Div. of FMC Corp., 566 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1978);
Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681 (1970); General
Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977).
133. 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978).
134. Id. at 180-81, 386 A.2d at 830. The court concluded that a jury question existed because
the manufacturer could have foreseen that the machine would be used without the guard. Id.
at 182, 386 A.2d at 831.
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to determine whether the misuse of the product had anything to do with
this injury.
Permitting the defendant's state of mind to control the significance of use
of the product is similar to presumed causation.'35 In presumed causation
the danger inherent in the product is used to decide both defect and causation,
and what actually happened is not examined. The unforeseeable misuse rule
also permits the danger caused by the defendant to control the issues of
defect and causation. As in presumed causation, a major part of what
happened-how the product was used-is ignored.
This argument does not suggest that the defendant's state of mind is
irrelevant. What the defendant should foresee is crucial to the duty issue.
Whether the defendant's action is tortious and whether it is a cause for
concern is, in part, determined by that state of mind.'36 What the defendant
should foresee, however, has nothing to do with whether the plaintiff's use
of the product was also a cause. The rule of unforeseeable misuse confuses
these two uses of the defendant's state of mind because the rule uses fore-
seeability to determine whether the plaintiff's use of the product was a cause.
The facts of Ellis v. K-Lan Co., 7 can illustrate how foreseeability of
misuse is used. In Ellis, a child was injured by a-drain declogger that his
mother had left within his reach. The suit on behalf of the child claimed
that the drain declogger was defective because it should have had a child
proof cap. Leaving the declogger within the child's reach was certainly
foreseeable. Thus, the misuse of the product did not provide a defense.
Leaving the declogger in the child's reach, however, was also a cause of the
injuries because "but for" that act by the mother, the child would not have
been injured. 3 8 The foreseeability of the misuse does not prevent it from
being a cause of the injury, and therefore does not render it irrelevant.
Presenting misuse of the product as a defense, however, could lead courts
to treat foreseeable misuses that are causes of the injury as if they were
135. For a discussion of presumed causation, see supra notes 47-56 and accompanying text.
136. But see Berkebile v. Brantly Helicopter Corp., 462 Pa. 83, 337 A.2d 893 (1975) (arguing
that foreseeability is part of a negligence case and because it describes defendant's state of
mind in negligence, it should not be used in strict liability cases). Other cases, however, argue
that foreseeability is important in strict liability cases, but the foreseeability that is relevant in
a negligence case is different from the foreseeability relevant in strict liability cases. Negligence
looks at foreseeability of harm while strict liability looks at foreseeability of use. Esbach v.
W.T. Grant's & Co., 481 F.2d 940, 943 (3d Cir. 1973); Newman v. Utility Trailer & Equip.
Co., 278 Or. 396, 397-99, 564 P.2d 674, 675-77 (1977); Ethicon, Inc. v. Parten, 520 S.W.2d
527 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). See also Polelle, The Foreseeability Concept and Strict Products
Liability: The Odd Couple of Tort Law, 8 RuT.-CAM. L.J. 101 (1976).
137. 695 F.2d 157 (5th Cir. 1983).
138. Id. at 163-64 nn.8 & 9. The court noted that plaintiff had failed to request jury charges
on the issues of comparative causation and superseding cause. Therefore, the court did not
have to state an opinion on whether having the declogger within the child's reach was the
superseding cause of the injury.
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irrelevant. 39 The unforeseeable misuse defense leads courts to overlook a
major factor that contributes to the injury.
The unforeseeable misuse defense can also lead courts to disregard the
fact that unforeseeable misuse does not always prevent the defective product
from being a cause of the injury. A slight variation on the facts of Ellis
illustrates this point. Assume that the mother saw the child open the drain
declogger and made no efforts to prevent the child from being injured. A
jury might find that a parent who sees a child playing with an open bottle
of drain declogger and does not take it away has unforeseeably misused the
product. The misuse of the product, however, does not prevent the defect
from being a cause of the injury.' 40 The lack of a child proof cap and the
parent's failure to take the bottle away from the child combined to cause
the injury. Both the manufacturer and the parent bear some responsibility.
Yet, the rule of unforeseeable misuse might require the court to ignore the
role that the defect had in causing injury.
The Texas Supreme Court recognized this problem in General Motors v.
Hopkins 4' and avoided it by comparing the causative effect of the two
acts. 42 Mr. Hopkins claimed that his injury was caused by a defective
carburetor in a car manufactured by the defendant. The defendant claimed
that the injury was caused by an unforeseeable misuse of the product: Mr.
Hopkins' bungled attempts to remove and reinstall the carburetor. The court
found that while the original carburetor was defective and could have caused
the accident, Mr. Hopkins' misuse of the product was unforeseeable and
could also have caused the accident. 43 The court reasoned that it would be
unfair to excuse the defendant when his defective product was a cause of
the injury. It also would be unfair to excuse the plaintiff when his un-
foreseeable misuse of the product was a cause of the injury. The Hopkins
court thus recognized that the rule of unforeseeable misuse could lead courts
to ignore important causes of the injury and the court apportioned damages
according to the amount that each cause contributed to the injury.44
139. Because the alleged misuse of the product was foreseeable, the court described it as a
"failure to adequately respond to a dangerous situation" created by the defect. Id. at 163 n.7.
Cf. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (adopting comparative fault because
drunk driving is foreseeable misuse and thus not relevant as a defense).
140. "But for" the lack of a child proof cap, the injury would not have occurred. Plaintiff's
action will break the chain of causation only if no modification by defendant could have
prevented the injury. Compare Garcia, discussed supra notes 99-103 and accompanying text with
Ellis. In Garcia, there was no evidence that defendant could do anything to prevent the injury, thus
the product could not have caused the injury.
141. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
142. Id. at 352. The Hopkins case and its use of comparative causation are discussed in
detail in Twerski, supra note 78.
143. 548 S.W.2d at 352.
144. Id.
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Misuse of the product could also support the defense of contributory or
comparative negligence. If the plaintiff's use of the product was unreasonable
in light of the foreseeable risk, recovery will be barred or reduced.145 Just
as most jurisdictions have adopted comparative negligence because of the
unfairness of the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence, most
jurisdictions that have a comparative negligence statute apply that statute
or some form of comparative fault in strict products liability casesY1
Comparative negligence is the converse of the defense of unforeseeable
misuse. In unforeseeable misuse the focus is on the defendant's state of
mind; if the defendant was not culpable in failing to prevent this injury
(that is, if the use was not foreseeable), the defendant has a defense. Com-
parative negligence focuses on the plaintiff's state of mind. The plaintiff's
act is deemed to have a significant role in causing the injury only if the
plaintiff was culpable. In comparative negligence, if the plaintiff is found
to be culpable, recovery depends on the culpability of the defendant.
This focus on state of mind is extremely unfair to the plaintiff. The move
to strict liability was caused, in large part, by the inability of many plaintiffs
to prove that manufacturers were culpable. 47 To remove that burden from
the defect issue and retain it as a defense means that many plaintiffs will
still be unable to recover because they cannot show that defendant was
culpable. The focus of these defenses thus penalizes those plantiffs whom
strict liability was designed to help.
This focus on state of mind appears to be inconsistent with the notion of
strict liability. Strict liability means that the defendant is liable even if not
negligent. 48 The defendant's state of mind or culpability is not part of the
plaintiff's case. To require the plaintiff to prove culpability when discussing
defenses undercuts the strict liability rule and creates a rule that is much
less than strict.
Some proponents of comparative fault avoid this conceptual difficulty by
arguing that the defendant's comparative fault is measured not by state of
145. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965) explains when con-
tributory negligence is a defense. The Hopkins court discussed the similarities between misuse
of the product and contributory negligence. 548 S.W.2d at 350.
146. See, e.g., Hasten, Comparative Liability Principles: Should They Now Apply to Strict
Liability Actions in Ohio, 14 U. ToL. L. REv. 1151, 1154 (1982) ("[Tlhe majority of common
law jurisdictions that have faced the issue have found some way to allow the state comparative
negligence statute to function in strict tort liability cases.") (quoting Plant, Comparative Neg-
ligence and Strict Liability, 40 LA. L. REv. 403, 406 (1980)).
147. In explaining the reasons for adopting strict liability, Justice Traynor stated that plaintiffs
are often not able to provide evidence of negligence because they lack information about the
manufacturing process. Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 463, 150 P.2d 436,
441 (1944) (Traynor, J., concurring). See also Comment, In the Stream of Commerce The
Liability of Non-Manufacturers in Product Liability Actions, 13 CAP. U.L. REv. 405 (1984)
(arguing that comparative fault is unfair to plaintiffs because it requires them to prove fault).
148. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965) states that the seller of a defective
product is liable even if that seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of the product.
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mind, but by how defective the product is. 49 Selling a defective product is
seen as a form of fault, and the more dangerous the product is, the greater
the seller's fault. This reasoning avoids the problems created by examining
the defendant's state of mind, but it creates a new conceptual problem. How
is the plaintiff's culpability compared with a product? What direction can
a judge give a jury in making such a comparison? It may be that, like apples
and oranges, the two cannot be compared.
VI. COMPARATIVE CAUSATION
The difficulties created by using the plaintiff's conduct as a defense, rather
than as part of what caused the injury, can be avoided by apportioning
damages based on causation. Comparative causation would recognize that
the plaintiff's conduct is often a significant cause of the injury regardless
of whether the defendant should have foreseen it. The unfairness of making
the plaintiff prove that the defendant was negligent is avoided because
causation is already part of the plaintiff's case. The apples and oranges
problem is avoided because causation will be compared with causation.
Comparative causation is not free from conceptual difficulty. Indeed, some
commentators argue against comparative causation on the ground that the
jury would not know how to divide causation.'50 The following proposal
should demonstrate the ease with which comparative causation can be used
to reach fair results.
Causation is commonly divided into two parts: cause-in-fact and proximate
cause. Cause-in-fact means that there must be a factual relationship between
the alleged cause and the alleged effect; it is often described as "but for"
causation. If the statement "'but for' X, Y would not have occurred" is
true, then X is said to be a cause-in-fact of Y. Proximate cause is primarily
a policy determination and is based on the probability that the risk created
by one action will lead to a given result.' Thus, a person's birth
may be a "but for" cause of an auto accident, but because birth does not
increase the probability of any particular accident, it will not be the proximate
cause of any accident. Failure to light a stairwell, for example, increases the
probability that people will fall, so that if there is a cause-in-fact relationship
between the fall and the darkness, it can be the proximate cause. If the
person who fell, however, was blind, and thus would not have been helped
by a light, the failure to light the stairwell did not cause the injury.
Causation should be compared by examining both of these factors. First,
how do the two causes interrelate? If, for example, one was a "but for"
149. See, e.g., Wade, supra note 127.
150. See, e.g., Aiken, Proportioning Comparative Neglicence: Problems of Theory and
Special Verdict Formulation, 53 MARQ. L. REa. 293, 296 (1970); Fischer, supra note 127, at
448; Hasten, supra note 146, at 1188.
151. Twerski, supra note 78, at 410 (citing Malone, supra note 34). See also Calabresi, supra
note 4 (arguing that causation is based on the increased likelihood of injury).
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cause of the other, or one increased the probability that the other would
occur, then that cause played a greater role in causing the injury. Second,
how much did each cause increase the likelihood that this would happen?
The cause that created the greater risk that this injury would occur played
a greater role in causing the injury.
The facts of General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins provide a good illustration.152
In Hopkins, the cause of the injury was deemed to be both the
defective carburetor and the plaintiff's abuse of the carburetor. The
relationship between the causes, however, indicates that the defect was the
greater cause. The defect in the carburetor caused sudden, unexpected ac-
celeration. In response to an episode of sudden acceleration, Mr. Hopkins
removed the carburetor. 53 The misuse of the product occurred while Mr.
Hopkins was attempting to repair the carburetor. The defect was a cause
of the misuse because "but for" the defect Mr. Hopkins would not have
removed the carburetor. The evidence presented on the risk created by these
two causes indicates that they were about equally dangerous. The two factors
can then be combined to find that the defect was the greater cause of the
injury.
In Hopkins, either the defect or the misuse alone could have caused the
injury. In most cases, however, neither act will be sufficient to cause injury,
as the injury generally results only from the interaction of the two causes.
The facts of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 54 provide a good illustration.
Daly, driving while intoxicated, crashed into a metal divider fence. His suit
claimed that a defective door latch caused him to be thrown from the car
and to sustain fatal injuries. 55 The first step in comparative causation is to
look at the relationship between the causes; the question is, was one a cause
of the other? In Daly, the defect in the product had nothing to do with the
driver's negligence. The driver's negligence, however, caused the defect to
manifest itself. But for the negligent driving, the defect would not have
caused the injury. The relationship between the causes indicates that the
plaintiff's action was the greater cause.
The second step in comparative causation is to compare how much each
action increased the likelihood of injury. Again, the plaintiff's action ap-
peared to be the greater cause. The defect in the door latch was its pushbutton
design, a design that is likely to cause the door to open when hit in the
side. Driving while intoxicated is more dangerous than designing a car with
a pushbutton door latch. The two factors combine to show that the causative
152. 548 S.W.2d 344 (Tex. 1977).
153. Id. at 346-47. Professor Twerski emphasized the relationship between the sudden ac-
celeration prior to the removal of the carburetor and the removal of the carburetor. See
Twerski, supra note 78, at 408.
154. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
155. Id. at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382. It was undisputed that if he had
remained in the car, his injuries would have been relatively minor. Id.
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impact of the plaintiff's action was much greater than the causative impact
of the defect.
When the plaintiff is negligent, but the negligence is the failure to perceive
the danger inherent in the product, the causative impact of the defect is
likely to be greater than the causative impact of the plaintiff's conduct. In
all such cases, the danger created by the product is a cause of the plaintiff's
negligence ("but for" the defect, the plaintiff would not have been negligent
in failing to see the danger created by the defect). The plaintiff's failure to
perceive the danger is likely to be the less risky activity because most products
are not dangerous in normal use.
Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp., 5 6 illustrates this point. In Bexiga,
the plaintiff's hand was crushed in a punch press. The plaintiff claimed that
the press was defective because it lacked a safety device that would have
prevented this injury. 'n The plaintiff should have been aware of the danger
and was thus negligent in failing to avoid it.""5 Both the defective product
and the plaintiff's negligence were causes of the injury, but the plaintiff's
negligence was the failure to perceive and avoid the danger created by the
defect. Comparative causation will require the defendant to pay the greater
portion of the damages because the causal impact of the defect was greater
than the causal impact of the negligence. The causal impact of the defect
is greater because the defect was a cause of the negligence ("but for" the
defect, the plaintiff would not have been negligent in failing to perceive the
danger created by the defect).
If one applied comparative fault to Bexiga, the plaintiff's recovery would
depend on whether the plaintiff could prove that Havir was culpable. Strict
liability was adopted to protect plaintiffs who were unable to prove negli-
gence. Comparative fault thus defeats the purpose of strict liability by requiring
plaintiffs to prove negligence. If the plaintiff cannot prove negligence, the
plaintiff is likely to bear the greater portion of the damages because he was
negligent. Comparative fault thus penalizes plaintiffs by apportioning dam-
ages by fault, a factor that is not part of the plaintiff's case in strict liability.
In addition, comparative causation is fairer than the rule that makes
contributory negligence irrelevant in strict liability. If the plaintiff's role in
causing the injury is ignored, the defendant will pay for that portion of the
injury caused by the plaintiff's negligence. There is no reason to require
defendants, or society through the risk spreading mechanism, to pay for
156. 60 N.J. 402, 290 A.2d 281 (1972).
157. Id. at 406, 290 A.2d at 283. Plaintiff's job required him to place discs on a die, then
press a lever that would cause a ram to descend and punch two holes in the disc. The accident
occurred when plaintiff noticed that a disc was not in its proper place and attempted to move
it while the ram was coming down. Id.
158. The court rejected contributory negligence as a defense, reasoning that "[it would be
anomalous to hold that the defendant has a duty to install safety devices but a breach of that
duty results in no liability for the very injury the duty was meant to protect against." Id. at
412, 290 A.2d at 286 (citing Bahlman v. Hudson Motor Car Co., 290 Mich. 683, 288 N.W.
309 (1939)).
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injuries caused by careless plaintiffs. Comparative causation recognizes this
and apportions damages accordingly.
Cases in which an inadequate warning is alleged to have caused injury
appear to be similar to the cases in which the plaintiff is negligent for failure
to perceive the danger. In both, the defendant created a danger that results
in injury, and the plaintiff caused injury by failing to react properly to that
danger. The danger inherent in the product is likely to be a cause of the
plaintiff's act, and the plaintiff's act cannot be a cause of the defect or the
danger inherent in the product.
The cases differ, however, in a number of significant ways. First, with
regard to a warning designed to provide information upon which the user
is to base a decision whether to use the product, some people will be injured
even if an adequate warning is given. This means that the danger inherent
in the product is both necessary and sufficient to cause injury. In the "failure
to perceive the danger" case, however, the danger is necessary to cause
injury, but never sufficient.5 9 The necessary and sufficient cause is a danger
to all concerned: aware, unaware or otherwise. On the other hand, the
danger that a reasonable person would perceive and avoid is dangerous only
to those who are unaware of it. Thus, because the danger in the warning
case is a necessary and sufficient cause, the danger is likely to be greater
than the danger in the "failure to perceive the danger" case.
Second, plaintiff's use of the product can vary greatly in degree of
riskiness. The plaintiff who is aware of the danger and is using the product
with an intent to injure is likely to be engaged in a higher risk activity than
the plaintiff who is unaware of the danger and is putting the product to
normal use. The defendant's marketing practices, moreover, can affect the
relative riskiness of the plaintiff's and the defendant's activities. The like-
lihood of injury from some products is the same to all users, regardless of
how they use the product. The risk created by the plaintiff's use is constant
while the risk created by the defendant will vary with the marketing scheme.
If the defendant warns of some danger, that decreases the likelihood of
injury. If the defendant makes the product look safer than it would otherwise
appear, that increases the likelihood of injury. The relative risks created by
the parties can thus vary with both the plaintiff's use and the defendant's
marketing.
These differences between the "failure to warn" cases and the "failure
to perceive the danger" cases make clear that whereas the plaintiff will
almost always be the lesser cause in "failure to perceive" cases, the plaintiff
may or may not be the greater cause in "failure to warn" cases. There will
be some "failure to warn" cases in which the plaintiff is the lesser cause,
and others in which the plaintiff is the far greater cause.160 Each warning
case will have to be examined individually.
159. It is not sufficient because all plaintiffs who perceive the danger can avoid it. See supra
note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the different types of warnings).
160. See, e.g., Finn v. G.D. Searle & Co., 35 Cal. 3d 691, 677 P.2d 1147, 200 Cal. Rptr.
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CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators grappling with the question of what must cause
injury in products liability cases have developed a number of specialized
rules to deal with the problems inherent in requiring a causal link between
defect and injury. The biggest problem with the "defect must cause injury"
rule is that it renders irrelevant many of the risks that are the key to finding
the product defective. The "defect must cause injury" rule is too narrow
and leads to a finding of no causation in many cases in which the danger
inherent in the product has caused injury.
Many of the rules developed to overcome this problem create even greater
problems. The presumption of causation often requires a court to presume
something that is not likely to be true. This can lead to findings for the
plaintiff when the defendant was not a cause-in-fact of the injury. The "sale
must cause injury" rule effectively eliminates causation from the case and
creates the same sort of unfairness as the presumption of causation.
A rule that would require the product to have caused injury can solve
both of these problems. It uses all the risks inherent in the product while
still requiring a causal link between the product and the injury. The "product
must cause injury" rule, however, is often viewed as unfairly pro-plaintiff
in that it fails to examine the plaintiff's role in causing the injury.
The use of the plaintiff's conduct as a defense enhances the problems
created by each of the above rules. Some courts ignore the plaintiff's role
as a cause of the injuries with the expectation that the problem created by
ignoring the plaintiff's role will be solved later in the case. Other courts use
the defenses to focus the case on the plaintiff's state of mind. Because of
the common use of comparative negligence, the focus on the plaintiff's state
of mind requires an examination of the defendant's state of mind, and the
strict liability aspect of the case is lost.
The best rule is one that requires the causal link between the product and
the injury and uses comparative causation. This rule which recognizes all
the risks inherent in the product, still requires that the plaintiff prove caus-
ation, and requires an examination of the plaintiff's role in causing injury.
The use of comparative causation will simplify the case by requiring only
one examination of the plaintiff's conduct and by imposing a comparison
of like items. Comparative causation also will reach fairer results because
it prevents the unfairness that can result from ignoring the plaintiff's role,
as well as the unfairness that can result from the tendency of comparative
negligence to eliminate the strict liability aspect of the case.
877 (1984) (plaintiff knew of the danger and disregarded it, thus breaking the causal connection
between the product and the injury).
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